The narrative of undisputed American supremacy in artificial intelligence is rapidly unraveling. In a recent op-ed published by CNBC, Dewardric L. McNeal argues that the US lead over China in AI is “all but gone.” EastFrontier has explored this dynamic in our story on the ‘co-opetition’ reality, where China and the US are building AI together while fighting over it. The piece highlights a fundamental divergence in strategy: while China has cultivated a robust, interconnected AI ecosystem capable of repeatedly producing world-class capabilities, Washington continues to rely on ad-hoc, company-by-company responses that fail to address the systemic nature of the challenge.
McNeal introduces the concept of “ecosystem statecraft” to describe Beijing’s approach. Rather than relying on a single national champion, China has fostered a diverse array of highly competitive AI firms, including DeepSeek, Moonshot (creator of Kimi K3), Alibaba (Qwen), Tencent (Hunyuan), Zhipu AI, and MiniMax. This ecosystem approach ensures that breakthroughs in one company quickly elevate the baseline for the entire industry, creating a resilient and rapidly iterating technological base that is increasingly difficult for the US to contain through targeted export controls.
The Power of Ecosystem Statecraft
The effectiveness of China’s strategy was recently underscored by President Xi Jinping’s address at the World AI Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, where he emphasized international AI cooperation, governance, and open-source development. By championing open-source models, Chinese firms are not only accelerating domestic innovation but also exporting their technological standards globally. This strategy directly counters the US approach, which has often focused on restricting access to proprietary models and advanced hardware.
The op-ed contrasts this with the perspective of US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who recently spoke about “addicting” the world to an American tech stack. McNeal argues that this mindset is increasingly obsolete in a world where highly capable, cost-effective, and open-source Chinese models are readily available. The rapid global adoption of models like Alibaba’s Qwen and DeepSeek’s V4 demonstrates that developers worldwide are prioritizing performance and accessibility over geopolitical allegiances.
A Call for a Systemic US Response
The core argument of the piece is that Washington’s current strategy, playing “whack-a-mole” with individual Chinese companies through entity lists and export controls—is insufficient to counter an ecosystem-level challenge. When the US restricts one avenue of technological acquisition, the Chinese ecosystem quickly adapts, finding alternative pathways or accelerating domestic development, as seen in the rapid progress of domestic AI chipmakers like Cambricon and Huawei.
To regain its footing, the op-ed suggests that the US must pivot from a defensive posture of containment to an offensive strategy of ecosystem cultivation. This would require massive, coordinated investments in fundamental research, STEM education, and domestic infrastructure, alongside a more nuanced approach to international technological partnerships. Until Washington recognizes that it is competing against a highly integrated ecosystem rather than isolated corporate entities, the gap between US and Chinese AI capabilities will continue to close.
The WAIC Signal and the Global South Play
The World AI Conference in Shanghai served as a vivid demonstration of China’s ecosystem confidence. Beyond the domestic showcase of competing models and applications, Beijing used the event to launch a global AI cooperation initiative, proposing a new international AI action plan centered on open-source tools, shared research, and a global AI governance body headquartered in Shanghai. This diplomatic offensive is a direct challenge to the US-led framework for AI governance, which has been criticized for prioritizing American commercial interests over inclusive global development.
The Global South is the primary battleground for this influence campaign. By offering high-performance, open-source AI models at near-zero cost, Chinese firms are building deep technological and economic relationships with developing nations across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. These relationships, once established through foundational AI infrastructure, are difficult to displace. Former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has warned that China is taking the lead on AI governance as the US abdicates its traditional role.
McNeal’s op-ed reinforces this view, arguing that the window for the US to reassert leadership is narrowing rapidly, and that only a fundamental rethinking of American AI strategy, one that embraces ecosystem-level thinking—can reverse the trend. The piece has already drawn significant attention within Washington policy circles, where the debate over how to respond to China’s AI ecosystem is intensifying ahead of the next round of export control reviews.
Whether the Biden-era framework of targeted restrictions or a more comprehensive industrial strategy will prevail in Washington remains an open question, but McNeal’s argument is that the clock is running out on the time available to make that choice. For readers of EastFrontier, the op-ed serves as a useful barometer of how the US policy establishment is beginning to internalize the scale of the challenge that China’s AI ecosystem now represents.