China’s Ministry of Commerce issued a formal warning on April 25, 2026, telling Washington that a set of semiconductor export control bills advancing through the US House of Representatives would “misuse export controls” and “undermine the international economic order.” The statement is Beijing’s official response to legislation that cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 22 and that, if enacted, would significantly tighten restrictions on the sale of chipmaking equipment and advanced semiconductors to China.
The bills in question include the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware Act, which would restrict exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China and require allied nations to adopt compatible controls. China’s Ministry of Commerce said it is “closely monitoring” the US legislative plans and will “take necessary steps to safeguard the lawful rights of domestic companies.” The ministry also accused Washington of “broadening of national security to justify trade curbs”, a formulation that Beijing has used consistently to frame US export controls as protectionism dressed up as security policy.
The Legislative Package Beijing Is Responding To
The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s April 22 markup session advanced 23 bills targeting China’s AI and chip supply chains. The package represents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date to restrict China’s access to the technologies it needs to build competitive AI infrastructure. Among the measures are provisions targeting dual-use technologies, advanced packaging techniques, and chip-manufacturing equipment for advanced nodes.
(Related: US House Foreign Affairs Committee Marks Up 23 Bills Targeting China’s AI and Chip Supply Chains)
Reuters reported that China’s statement specifically called out the risk to global chip supply chains, arguing that restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment would create disruptions that extend well beyond the US-China bilateral relationship. The argument is a familiar one from Beijing: that US export controls are not merely a bilateral trade dispute but a threat to the global technology ecosystem on which all countries depend.
The Straits Times, citing Bloomberg, reported that China’s statement warned the bills could “harm the global chip industry”, language that is calibrated to appeal to third-country governments and semiconductor equipment makers in Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea, all of which have significant exposure to the Chinese market and have been under pressure from Washington to align their own export control regimes with US restrictions.
ASML, Tokyo Electron, and the Equipment Makers in the Middle
The equipment companies most directly affected by the proposed legislation are ASML of the Netherlands, Tokyo Electron of Japan, and Applied Materials and Lam Research of the United States. ASML’s deep ultraviolet lithography machines, which China can still legally import, are already the subject of separate legislative efforts to close what critics call the “DUV loophole.” The new bills would add further restrictions on top of existing controls, potentially cutting off China’s access to the equipment it needs to advance its domestic chip manufacturing capabilities.
China’s response is partly directed at these equipment makers and their home governments. By framing the bills as a threat to global supply chains rather than a bilateral dispute, Beijing is seeking to build a coalition of countries and companies with a shared interest in keeping the semiconductor market open. That strategy has had mixed results: Japan and the Netherlands have both tightened their own export controls under US pressure, but neither has gone as far as Washington would like.
For China’s domestic chip industry, the stakes are high. China’s two largest contract chipmakers, SMIC and Hua Hong, have both reported record revenue in recent quarters, driven by demand for mature-node chips used in AI edge devices, automotive electronics, and consumer products. But their ability to advance to more competitive process nodes depends on access to equipment that the proposed legislation would further restrict.
Beijing’s Strategic Calculus
China’s formal protest is unlikely to stop the bills from advancing, but it serves several purposes. It signals to domestic companies and investors that Beijing is actively monitoring and responding to US legislative moves. It creates a public record of China’s objections that can be cited in future trade disputes. And it puts pressure on allied governments, particularly in Europe and Asia, to consider the economic consequences of aligning too closely with US restrictions.
The Ministry of Commerce’s statement that China will “take necessary steps to safeguard the lawful rights of domestic companies” is also a signal that Beijing is prepared to respond with countermeasures if the bills become law. China has previously used export controls on critical minerals, including gallium, germanium, and rare earth elements, as a retaliatory tool, and the threat of further restrictions on materials that are essential to semiconductor manufacturing is an implicit part of Beijing’s negotiating posture.
The Domestic Industry’s Exposure
For China’s domestic chip industry, the proposed legislation arrives at a moment of genuine progress but continued vulnerability. SMIC and Hua Hong have both reported record revenue in recent quarters, driven by demand for mature-node chips used in AI edge devices, automotive electronics, and consumer products. But their ability to advance to more competitive process nodes depends on access to equipment that the proposed legislation would further restrict. SMIC’s most advanced production node is currently 7nm, achieved using existing DUV equipment in a multi-patterning configuration. Advancing to 5nm and below would require either EUV lithography, which China cannot currently access, or further innovations in multi-patterning techniques that push DUV equipment beyond its designed specifications. The proposed bills, if enacted, would tighten restrictions on the DUV equipment that SMIC currently relies on, potentially slowing its node advancement even further.
The Ministry of Commerce’s formal protest is therefore not merely diplomatic posturing. It reflects a genuine assessment that the proposed legislation, if enacted, would materially affect the trajectory of China’s semiconductor industry at a critical juncture. Beijing’s response — warning of countermeasures and framing the bills as a threat to global supply chains — is calibrated to maximize pressure on the allied governments and equipment makers whose cooperation is essential to the effectiveness of any US-led export control regime.
(Related: US Match Act Scaled Back Under Industry Pressure but ASML DUV Restriction Survives)