As the United States and China compete for technological supremacy, the battleground is expanding beyond microchips and algorithms to the realm of governance and standards. A new analysis by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute details how Beijing is systematically exporting its AI governance model to Southeast Asia, leveraging the region’s desire for rapid economic development to establish Chinese norms as the default standard.
The paper, authored by Wang Zheng, outlines a sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy that Beijing is deploying across the ASEAN bloc. This outreach is characterized by what the author describes as a “state-centric, development-oriented, and cooperation-focused” approach to AI governance, which often resonates more strongly with Southeast Asian governments than the rights-based frameworks promoted by Western nations.
The Three Pillars of Outreach
According to the ISEAS analysis, China’s AI governance outreach to Southeast Asia relies on three primary channels:
1. Establishing Joint Research Centers and Laboratories: Beijing is actively funding and building physical infrastructure across the region. The China-ASEAN Artificial Intelligence Collaborative Innovation Center, headquartered in Nanning, Guangxi, serves as a central hub. By late 2025, this center had signed cooperation agreements with Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Myanmar.
These centers are not merely symbolic; they are producing tangible outputs. The China-Laos center, inaugurated in September 2025, released a Lao National Large Model capable of Chinese-Lao-English translation. Similarly, the China-Vietnam center in Hanoi released a Vietnamese National Large Model in November 2025. In Malaysia, a joint venture established an AI Innovation Cooperation Centre in Selangor in April 2025.
2. Convening AI-Themed Forums and Policy Events: China is utilizing high-level diplomatic platforms to shape the regional discourse on AI. At the Second China-ASEAN Digital Governance Dialogue in December 2025, the parties released the “Initiative on Deepening China-ASEAN Cooperation on Digital Governance.” This initiative laid out a three-point plan focusing on risk response and security management, policy exchanges, and multilateral platform coordination.
3. Hosting AI Training Programs for Elites: Perhaps the most impactful channel is the direct training of Southeast Asian officials. The ISEAS report notes that by December 2025, the Guangxi government had hosted seven AI training programs for 260 national-level ASEAN officials. Additionally, they conducted five specialized sessions for over 200 local officials and party cadres from Vietnam. These programs serve to familiarize regional decision-makers with Chinese technology and governance philosophies.
The Strategic Narrative
Beijing’s outreach is carefully framed to appeal to the developmental priorities of ASEAN nations. The narrative emphasizes “leveraging AI and other emerging technologies to better tell stories of China-ASEAN friendship and collaboration.” This approach contrasts sharply with the US focus on mitigating existential risks and protecting democratic values.
By positioning itself as a partner in technological capacity-building, China is laying the groundwork for long-term influence. As noted in recent coverage of Xi Jinping’s call for original innovation, Beijing views technological self-reliance and global standard-setting as intertwined objectives.
The success of this strategy in Southeast Asia could have profound implications for the global AI landscape. If Chinese norms regarding data sovereignty, state control, and algorithmic regulation become entrenched in the region, it will create a massive, unified market operating on principles that diverge significantly from those of the West. As the US and China continue to decouple, Southeast Asia is emerging as the critical swing state in the global AI governance architecture.
The ISEAS analysis carefully notes the limits of Beijing’s approach. Wang Zheng writes that China’s state-centric governance model “may not transfer neatly across Southeast Asia,” and that its initiatives “can generate concerns about interoperability with US and allied tech stacks, transparency, and dependency risks.” China Mobile’s September 2025 Southeast Asia Cooperation Conference, which launched a “Southeast Asia Revitalisation Initiative” through its AI+ International Ecosystem Alliance, illustrates the commercial dimension of this outreach: governance norms and commercial infrastructure are being deployed together, making it difficult for recipient countries to adopt one without the other.
Wang Zheng concludes that Southeast Asian governments should engage critically with China’s AI governance frameworks, seeking capacity-building benefits while maintaining the policy space to adopt alternative standards when their national interests require it. For ASEAN governments navigating between Washington and Beijing, the choice of AI governance partner is increasingly inseparable from their geopolitical alignment.