A sweeping U.S. legislative effort to tighten the noose around China’s semiconductor industry has been significantly scaled back following intense pushback from the global chipmaking equipment industry. The “MATCH Act” (Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware Act), introduced in early April, originally aimed to force allies to align with U.S. controls and impose expansive new restrictions. However, the latest draft reveals a more tailored approach, while retaining a critical new countrywide restriction on ASML’s deep ultraviolet (DUV) immersion lithography machines.
The original version of the bill, introduced by Republican Representative Michael Baumgartner with bipartisan support, was viewed with alarm by the industry. Experts described it as a “runaway train” that threatened to severely disrupt global supply chains and harm sales for equipment manufacturers both in the U.S. and abroad. The aggressive scope of the initial draft prompted a rapid lobbying effort, resulting in the removal of several controversial provisions.
What Was Removed and What Remains
The revised MATCH Act has stripped out countrywide curbs on cryogenic etch tools, which are primarily manufactured by California-based Lam Research and Japan’s Tokyo Electron. This concession acknowledges the complex realities of the global semiconductor equipment market and the potential blowback on allied nations’ industries.
However, the bill’s core objective, restricting China’s access to advanced chipmaking capabilities, remains intact. The most significant surviving provision is a new countrywide restriction on ASML’s DUV immersion lithography machines. Netherlands-based ASML is the dominant global supplier of this critical technology, which is essential for manufacturing advanced semiconductors. This restriction represents a significant escalation, targeting the workhorse machines that Chinese foundries rely on as they attempt to build self-sufficiency in the face of existing bans on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography tools.
Furthermore, the tailored bill still explicitly prohibits foreign firms from selling equipment to major Chinese chipmakers, including ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC), and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), for use in facilities that are already barred by Washington from using American tools.
The Battle Over Servicing and Alignment
Another highly contentious issue addressed in the revised bill is the servicing of equipment already installed in China. The MATCH Act still requires licenses for servicing equipment in covered facilities—a major point of friction for foreign firms. However, in a significant concession, applications for these servicing licenses will no longer face a presumptive policy of denial, offering a potential, albeit restricted, pathway for ongoing maintenance.
The legislation also attempts to force the issue of multilateral alignment. The U.S. has struggled to fully align its export controls with key allies like the Netherlands and Japan. The MATCH Act imposes a strict deadline on diplomatic negotiations with allied supplier countries. If an agreement is not reached by the deadline, the bill directs the U.S. government to unilaterally impose controls, utilizing mechanisms like foreign direct product rules or minimum U.S.-content thresholds.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to vote on the revised bill next Wednesday, alongside a slate of other legislation tied to AI, semiconductors, and export controls. The Chinese embassy in Washington has strongly condemned the legislative effort, stating that “China opposes the US’s overstretching the national security concept and using all sorts of pretexts to coerce other countries into joining its technological blockade.”
As the U.S. continues to refine its strategy of technological containment, the evolution of the MATCH Act highlights the delicate balancing act between national security objectives and the economic realities of a deeply interconnected global industry.